Limited Relief for Federal Employees Hypersensitive to Tobacco Smoke: Federal Employers Who\u27d Rather Fight May Have to Switch by Cliff, Carolyn
Washington Law Review 
Volume 59 Number 2 
4-1-1984 
Limited Relief for Federal Employees Hypersensitive to Tobacco 
Smoke: Federal Employers Who'd Rather Fight May Have to 
Switch 
Carolyn Cliff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Legal Remedies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carolyn Cliff, Comment, Limited Relief for Federal Employees Hypersensitive to Tobacco Smoke: Federal 
Employers Who'd Rather Fight May Have to Switch, 59 Wash. L. Rev. 305 (1984). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol59/iss2/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
LIMITED RELIEF FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
HYPERSENSITIVE TO TOBACCO SMOKE:
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS WHO'D RATHER FIGHT
MAY HAVE TO SWITCH
For over ten years, the Surgeon General has officially recognized the
potential hazards which secondhand tobacco smoke' presents to the
health of nonsmokers. 2 An increasing body of medical research supports
the proposition that tobacco smoke presents a health risk not only to those
who smoke voluntarily3 but also to those involuntarily exposed to tobacco
smoke.4
1. Secondhand smoke has two sources: mainstream smoke, which is exhaled by the smoker, and
sidestream smoke, which is released directly from the burning end of the cigarette and from the
mouthpiece when the smoker is not inhaling. Sidestream smoke contains a much greater concentra-
tion of toxic components because smokers "filter" mainstream smoke by inhaling it. STANFORD
ENVrL. LAW Soc'Y, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF SMOKING REGULATION 8-9 (1978).
2. The 1972 Surgeon General's Report on the hazards of smoking included for the first time
sections on the adverse effects of nonsmokers' exposure to secondary smoke. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 101-35 (1972).
Subsequent reports have periodically included similar sections. E.g, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 1975, at 83-112
(summarizing studies of nonsmoker absorption of toxic components in tobacco smoke and pathologi-
cal effects of nonsmoker exposure) [hereinafter cited as 1975 HEALTH CONSEQUENCES]; PUBUC
HEALTH SERv., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING-
CANCER 237-54 (1982) (summarizing evidence of relationship between involuntary smoking and
lung cancer) [hereinafter cited as 1982 HEALTH CONSEQUENCES].
3. See generally PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'TOF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING-CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE 1-242 (1983) (summarizing medical evi-
dence that voluntary smoking is a major cause of cardiovascular disease); 1982 HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES, supra note 2, at 1-235 (summarizing medical evidence of relationships between voluntary
smoking and various forms of cancer; concludes that smoking is the major cause of lung cancer in this
country).
4. See, e.g., Hirayama, Non-smoking wives of heavy smokers have a higher risk of lung cancer:
a studyfrom Japan, 282 BRrr. MED. J. 183, 183-85 (1981) (nonsmoking wives of smoking husbands
have a higher risk of developing lung cancer than wives of nonsmokers); Miller, Lung Cancer: A
Comparison of Incidence Between the Amish and Non-Amish in Lancaster County, 1983 J. IND. ST.
MED. A. 121, 123 (1983) (lower incidence of lung cancer in Amish than in non-Amish population
due to absence of secondhand smoke); White & Froeb, Small-Airways Dysfunction in Nonsmokers
Chronically Exposed to Tobacco Smoke, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 720, 720-23 (1980) (passive smok-
ers have same risk of long-term small-airways dysfunction as light and non-inhaling smokers). See
generally Comment, Where There's Smoke There's Ire: The Search for Legal Paths to Tobacco-Free
Air, 3 COLUM. J. FOR ENVrL. L. 62, 62-68 (1976) (collecting and analyzing available medical evi-
dence of hazards of involuntary smoking); Comment, The Non-Smoker in Public: A Review and
Analysis of Non-Smokers' Rights, 7 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 141, 143-47 (1979) (same).
The term "involuntary smoking" refers to the inhaling of tobacco smoke by individuals who are
not themselves smoking but who are breathing in an atmosphere with tobacco smoke. This phenome-
non is also described as "passive smoking." 1975 HEALTH CONSEQUENCES, supra note 2, at 87.
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Despite legislative 5 and judicial6 efforts to control tobacco smoking in
public places, smoking in the workplace continues to cause problems.
This Comment analyzes two recent decisions that addressed claims for
relief by federal government employees who suffer severe reactions to
tobacco smoke: Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Board,7 and Vickers
v. Veterans Administration.8 The claims were brought under statutory
schemes designed to meet the employment needs of the physically or
mentally disadvantaged. The relief granted or considered in each decision
gave the hypersensitive nonsmoker only a partial victory. In addition, the
Vickers and Parodi decisions offer no assistance to nonsmokers who are
not hypersensitive but who are concerned enough about the health
hazards of involuntary exposure to want smoking prohibited in the work-
place. Nonetheless, they offer hope to those most immediately injured by
involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke: hypersensitive nonsmokers.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The effort to prohibit tobacco smoking in the workplace has previously
arisen under a variety of legal theories, ranging from constitutional
claims9 to common-law nuisance10 and assault and battery. " Regardless
of the theory for relief, however, the inability of plaintiffs to demonstrate
5. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25.14.102-. 105 (1973) (smoking prohibited in most public places
with exception of enclosed offices occupied exclusively by smokers); MINN. STAT ANN. §§
144.411-.417 (West Supp. 1983) (same); MONT CODE ANN. §§ 50.40.101-. 109 (1983) (covers most
places of work but requires only segregation of smokers and nonsmokers); NEB REV. STAT §§ 71-
5701 to -5708 (1981) (smoking prohibited in most public places with exception of enclosed offices
occupied exclusively by smokers); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76.10.101-.106 (1978) (power to restrict or
prohibit smoking in private places of employment delegated to local boards of health).
6. E.g., Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div.
1976) (banning tobacco smoke in workplace of hypersensitive nonsmoker); Smith v. Western Elec.
Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (same). See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
7. 690F.2d731 (9thCir. 1982).
8. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
9. See, e.g., Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La.
1976) (claims brought under fifth and fourteenth amendments' due process clauses, on theory that
tobacco smoke pollution threatens right to live in non-hazardous environment; under ninth amend-
ment, on theory that right to smoke-free air is a "fundamental right"; and under first amendment, on
theory that permitting smoking in public places forces nonsmokers to stay away, thereby infringing
their right to get information), affd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073
(1979); Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights (FENSR) v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181
(D.D.C. 1978) (claims under first and fifth amendments), affd mem., 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
10. Ravreby v. United Airlines, 293 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Iowa 1980) (theory abandoned on ap-
peal). Numerous commentators have suggested this approach. E.g., Comment, The Legal Conflict
Between Smokers and Nonsmokers: The Majestic Vice Versus The Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L.
REv. 444,467-70 (1980), and authorities cited therein.
11. McCracken v. Sloan, 40 N.C. App. 214,252 S.E.2d 250 (1979).
306
Relief for Hypersensitive Federal Employees
immediate harm from their exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke is a
major obstacle to all such efforts. 12 Although some long-term health
hazards of involuntary smoking have already been identified, 13 studies
have as yet shown only minor immediate health consequences for the av-
erage healthy nonsmoker involuntarily exposed to tobacco smoke. 14
The adverse health consequences of involuntary exposure to tobacco
smoke vary, however, with the susceptibility of the person exposed.15
For individuals who are allergic or "hypersensitive" to tobacco smoke,
exposure can result in a variety of symptoms, including substantial diffi-
culty in breathing. 16 Only hypersensitive nonsmokers have successfully
obtained judicial relief for smoking in the workplace. 17 In 1976, in Shimp
v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 18 the Superior Court of New Jersey
became the first court to recognize and protect the rights of hypersensitive
employees to a workplace free of tobacco smoke. The Shimp court
granted injunctive relief 19 banning tobacco smoking in Shimp's work-
place, basing its decision on the common-law duty which every employer
owes its employees to provide a safe working environment. 20
12. See, e.g., Rotenberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 Colo. App. 161,590 P.2d 521 (1979); Ruck-
stuhl v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 57 Pa. Commw. 302, 426
A.2d 719, 721 (1981); see also McCracken, 252 S.E.2d at 252 (although plaintiff using battery
theory need only establish harmful or offensive contact rather than actual harm, "[s]melling smoke
from a cigar ... would ordinarly be considered... an innocuous and generally permitted contact").
13. Seesupranotes2& 4.
14. 1975 HEALTH CONSEQUENCES. supra note 2, at 107 ("the effects of cigarette smoke on
healthy nonsmokers consists [sic] mainly of minor eye and throat irritation").
15. Id. at 99.
16. A. BRODY & B. BRODY, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF NONSMoKERs 33 (1977). Exposure to tobacco
smoke can also significantly exacerbate the medical condition of individuals who have chronic car-
diovascular or lung disease. 1975 HEALTH CONSEQUENCES, supra note 2, at 105-07.
17. E.g., Alexander v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 104 Cal. App. 3d 97, 163
Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980) (allergic plaintiff entitled to unemployment benefits because she had good
cause to refuse employment where tobacco smoking permitted); see also Schober v. Mountain Bell
Tel., 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231 (1980) (hypersensitive claimant awarded partial disability benefits
under state workers' compensation statute).
18. 145 N.J. Super. 516,368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div. 1976).
19. See Shimp, 368 A.2d at 416. The Shimp decision was unprecedented in its use of an injunc-
tion to relieve unsafe working conditions. Although prior decisions awarding damages for injuries
sustained by employees had recognized that employers have a duty to provide a reasonably safe
workplace, no prior court had "directly ruled on the question of an employee's right to compel his
employer to provide safe working conditions." Note, Torts-Occupational Safety and Health-Em-
ployee's Common Law Right to a Safe Workplace Compels Employer to Eliminate Unsafe Condi-
tions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1074, 1077 n. 14 (1977). For extensive analyses of the Shimp decision, see
id. at 1074-83; Note, Employment-Employee's Right to a Safe, Healthy Work Environment-In-
junction Issued Prohibiting Tobacco Smoking in Offices and Customer Service Area on Employer's
Premises, 8 CuM. L. REv. 579 (1977).
20. 368 A.2d. at 410-11.
In 1982, the Missouri Court of Appeals employed a similar rationale in Smith v. Western Elec.,
643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), and became the second state court to approve of injunctive
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The Parodi and Vickers opinions discussed the rights of hypersensitive
employees to a smoke-free workplace under theories strikingly different
from the Shimp decision. Each claim was based on a federal statute, 2 1 and
both plaintiffs successfully established an extreme sensitivity to tobacco
smoke that qualified them for special consideration in employment. 22
II. THE PARODI DECISION
A. Opinion of the Court
Irene Parodi, a federal employee, was transferred to an office where
many other employees smoked cigarettes. 23 She began to miss work due
to pulmonary difficulties diagnosed as "asthmatic bronchitis with hyper-
irritable airways disease.' 24 Her doctor recommended that she not return
to work in that environment.
Parodi filed a petition for federal disability retirement benefits with the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). 25 The OPM found that she was
not "totally disabled" within the meaning of the disability retirement
statute and denied her petition for benefits. 26 The Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board (MSPB)27 affirmed the OPM's decision. 28
Parodi appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that
the OPM and MSPB had misconstrued the statutory definition of "disa-
bility." 29 The version of the statute governing Parodi's claim defined di-
relief to eliminate tobacco smoke in the workplace to protect the rights of a hypersensitive employee.
Id. at 12-13.
21. Parodi claimed that she was entitled to disability retirement benefits under the version of 5
U.S.C. § 8337(a) then in effect: Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8331(6), 80 Stat. 378,
572 (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 8337(a) (1982)). See Parodi, 690 F.2d at 737. Vickers brought
suit under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981), which prevents
executive agencies from discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals solely by reason of
their handicaps. See Vickers. 549 F. Supp. at 87.
22. Parodi, 690 F.2d at 738; Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 86-87.
23. 690 F.2d at 732.
24. Id. at 737 n.9. Although Parodi sustained no permanent physical injury, one doctor who
examined her conducted a test exposing her to cigarette smoke which produced acute adverse reac-
tions within four minutes. Id. at 733.
25. Id. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is responsible for the administration of 5
U.S.C. § 8331-8348 (1982), pursuant to id. § 8347(a), including determining questions of disabil-
ity for the purposes of § 8337. 5 U.S.C. § 8347(c) (1982).
26. 690 F.2d at733.
27. The OPM's decision was reviewed by the MSPB pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8347(d) (1982).
28. The MSPB did note that Parodi " 'might reasonably be concerned with the probable risk to
her future health from working in an environment where exposure to cigarette smoke presents a
hazard to all employees, and particularly to herself because of her peculiar physical sensitivity.'
690 F.2d at 733 (quoting MSPB opinion).
29. Although 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (1982) provides for review of MSPB decisions by the United
States Court of Claims or Court of Appeals, § 8347(c) insulates decisions of the OPM determining
Vol. 59:305, 1984
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sability as the inability to provide useful and efficient service due to dis-
ease or injury. 30 After noting that Parodi's condition was diagnosed as a
disease, the Ninth Circuit found that she was disabled because she was
unable to perform useful and efficient service in the smoke-filled condi-
tions which existed in her workplace. 31 The court reasoned that the condi-
tions in Parodi's workplace imposed an "environmental limitation"
which rendered her as disabled for her job assignment in a smoke-filled
office as any physical or mental limitation. 32
questions of disability arising under the disability retirement statute: "the decisions of the Office
concerning these matters are final and conclusive and are not subject to review." 5 U.S.C. § 8347(c)
(1982). OPM and MSPB contended that Parodi's claim was not subject to any judicial review. 690
F.2d at 734. However, the Parodi court adopted a limited form of judicial review as first outlined in
Scroggins v. United States, 397 F.2d 295 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968), permitting
judicial review where the agency has substantially infringed procedural rights, misconstrued a con-
trolling statute, or committed "some like error going to the heart of the administrative determina-
tion." 690 F.2d at 737.
The Eighth Circuit has rejected the Scroggins rule, holding that 5 U.S.C. § 8347(c) (1982) pre-
cludes any judicial reveiw of voluntary disability decisions. Morgan v. Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 675 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1982).
30. Prior to its amendment in 1980, the statute defined disability as "total disability . . . for
useful and efficient service in the grade of class or position last occupied by the employee or Member
because of disease or injury not due to vicious habits, intemperance, or willful misconduct on his part
within 5 years before becoming so disabled." Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8331(6),
80 Stat. 378, 566 (formerly codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8331(6); repealed 1980).
In 1980, Congress repealed § 8331(6) and added a new definition of disability. Omnibus Reconcil-
iation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 403(a), (b), 94 Stat. 2599, 2605-06 (§ 403(a) is codified at
5 U.S.C. § 8337(a) (1982); § 403(b) repealed former § 8331(6)). The new definition provides:
Any employee shall be considered to be disabled only if the employee if [sic] found by the
Office of Personnel Management to be unable, because of disease or injury, to render useful and
efficient service in the employee's position and is not qualified for reassignment, under pro-
cedures prescribed by the Office, to a vacant position.., at the same grade or level and in which
the employee would be able to render useful and efficient service.
5 U.S.C. § 8337(a) (1982).
According to the legislative history, this change was designed to modify only the requirement
imposed by some courts, notably Cerano v. Fleischman, 339 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 855 (1965), that suitable employment of the same grade or position be limited to the spe-
cific position occupied by the employee prior to a determination of disability. H.R. REP. No. 1167,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 206, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5526, 5651. The new
definition was intended to retain the "present requirement that the employee be unable, because of
disease or injury, to render useful and efficient service in his or her position." Id.
31. 690 F.2d at 738. The court reasoned that the statute did not require that the claimant have a
serious or permanent physical problem. Id. The court contrasted the statute's definition of disability
with that provided in the federal disability insurance benefits statute, which defines disability as the
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable phys-
ical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)
(1976).
32. The court dismissed the contention that Parodi was not entitled to disability benefits because
she was physically able to perform the tasks of her job in a smoke-free environment as "irrelevant."
690 F.2d at 738. The court noted that environmental limitations (or "non-exertional limitations")
were recognized in analogous areas of the law. Id. at 739 n.13. For example, the Social Security
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The court explained, however, that Parodi would not be disabled under
the statute if the government offered her employment at the same grade
level with working conditions suitable for her environmental limitation. 33
Therefore, the court gave the government-employer two alternatives.
First, it could relocate Parodi in a comparable smoke-free position. Sec-
ond, it could remove the environmental limitation at her present work-
place by imposing a partial or total ban on tobacco smoke in the work-
place. 34 The court held that if it did neither, Parodi was entitled to
disability benefits. 35
B. Analysis of the Court's Opinion
The Parodi court correctly rejected the OPM's distinction between
physical or mental limitations and environmental limitations. Because the
statutory definition of disability is functional rather than developmental, 36
the test is whether the employee is unable, because of disease or injury, to
provide useful and efficient service in her assigned position. This ap-
proach necessarily includes environmental limitations imposed by the na-
ture or location of a claimant's work. Whether Parodi could perform the
physical tasks of her position outside of her assigned workplace is irrele-
vant. 37
Administration defines "environmental restrictions" as "restrictions which result in inability to to-
lerate some physical feature(s) of work settings that occur in certain industries or types of work, e.g.,
an inability to tolerate dust or fumes. " 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 200.00(e) (1983).
33. 690 F.2d at 739. The court placed the burden of proving that a suitable job was available on
the agency, reasoning that the agency was in a better position than Parodi to demonstrate the availa-
bility of a suitable job. Id. The court relied on Cerrano v. Fleishman, 339 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 855 (1965), which held that an employee seeking disability retirement benefits
did not have to prove that "he was unable to perform any of the jobs which for administrative con-
venience are put in the same grade or class and in which, at the time, there might be an opening." Id.
at 931. Although the Cerrano court's requirement that the government show alternative employment
in the particular position of the claimant was specifically changed under the new statutory definition
of disability, see supra note 30, it remains true under the new statute that the government is in a better
position than the claimant to know of the availability of an appropriate job without the environmental
limitations present at the existing job.
34. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (Parodi court's confusion of reduction with elimi-
nation of tobacco smoke).
35. 690 F.2d at 739. The Parodi court gave the government 60 days in which to make its deci-
sion. Id. at 740. Because it was unclear from the record whether the government had offered Parodi
suitable alternative employment, the court remanded the case to the district court. It also suggested
that the district court could extend the 60-day limitation if good cause was shown. Id.
36. A developmental disability is a severe and chronic disability which impedes development of
a person's ability to function normally in society. See 42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (Supp. V 1981).
37. The question whether a person is "disabled" necessarily turns upon why the question is
asked. For example, a paraplegic may have no difficulty in providing useful and efficent service in
most positions but may be "disabled" under 5 U.S.C. § 8337(a) (1982) if his job conditions require
the mobility of an able-bodied person. See generally DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES STATE LEGISLA-
Vol. 59:305, 1984
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Unlike physical or mental limitations, however, removal of an environ-
mental limitation effectively eliminates the disability as well. Because
Parodi could perform usefully and efficiently in a smoke-free environ-
ment, she would not be disabled in a smoke-free workplace. In addition,
environmental limitations can be inherent or incidental to the work to be
performed. 38 Parodi's environmental limitation was incidental to her po-
sition as an office worker because offices can and do function in a smoke-
free atmosphere. 39
Yet under the disability retirement statute, the court could only order
that Parodi was entitled to disability benefits. The court's discussion of
employer alternatives went only to the threshold issue of whether Parodi
was "disabled" within the meaning of the statute. The statute simply pro-
vides retirement benefits for disabled federal employees with five or more
years service. Under the statute, courts can only determine whether an
employee is disabled: they cannot require the government to remove the
environmental limitation imposed on a hypersensitive employee by her
smoking coworkers.
Even within the statutory limitations, however, the Parodi court was
unnecessarily ambiguous in outlining the government's options. It left
unclear whether the government can correct the environmental restriction
by reducing rather than eliminating Parodi's exposure to tobacco smoke
at the workplace. The court expressly suggested that a position in a work-
place with less smoke could be suitable employment for Parodi. 40 By giv-
TIVE PRoJECT, COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, ELIMINATING ENVIRONMENTAL BARRIERS I n.2
(1979) (discussing wide divergence in estimates on numbers of disabled persons in the United States
due to varying effects of defined handicaps in different life activities).
38. A person who is afraid of heights is environmentally limited in a career as a window-washer
of high-rise buildings because the environmental limitation is inherent in that type of workplace: it
cannot be eliminated. In contrast, the environmental limitation which an office with entrances inac-
cessible to wheelchairs presents to paraplegics is an incidental limitation: it will not impair the func-
tioning of an office to make its entrances accessible. See infra note 62 (differentiating between sur-
mountable and insurmountable impairment barriers).
39. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT Assocs., PuB. No. MB-200, IMPROVING THE
WORK ENVIRONMENT-A MANAGEMENT GUIDETO SMOKE FREE WORK AREAS (1983) (listing manage-
ment advantages to banning smoking in the workplace and reporting legal challenges to employers
who permit smoking); Amicone, Clearing the Smoke from the Workplace, AM. LUNG A. BuLL., Dec.
1981, at 4 (reviewing costs of employee smoking and employer experiences in restricting or banning
smoking); The Weekly (Seattle), May 4-10, 1983, at 9, col. I (presenting estimates of annual cost of
one employee's smoking habit to an employer ranging from $624 to $4789 per year and reviewing
Northwest employers' experiences in restricting or banning smoking). But see Montagno, Minnesota:
No Smoking, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 1975, at 35 (reporting business concerns about no-smoking policies
because of costs of increased breaks for smokers and preferential treatment in number of breaks over
nonsmokers); The Weekly (Seattle), May 4-10, 1983, at 9, col. I (although cost-savings can be
achieved through active management efforts, implementation of no-smoking policies can cause com-
plaints about smokers taking extra breaks from work to smoke).
40. 690 F.2d at 740 n.15. However, the court's suggestion that both parties agreed that Parodi
could work in an environment containing less smoke, id. at 737, is inconsistent with its observation
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ing the government the option to offer a position in a workplace with
"less smoke" as suitable employment, however, the court left open an-
other question: how much must the employer reduce Parodi's exposure to
tobacco smoke to remove the environmental limitation? The statutory
standard-until she is able to perform useful and efficient service-does
not provide the government with concrete guidelines as to how much to-
bacco smoke is permissible. If, moreover, Parodi is unable to work in
conditions involving any exposure to tobacco smoke, there is no "less
smoke" alternative for the government employer.
Because involuntary smoking presents a long-term health risk to all in-
dividuals 41 and no-smoking policies improve overall job efficiency, 42 it is
senseless to allow the government to remove the hypersensitive employee
by paying disability benefits rather than removing the unnecessary envi-
ronmental hazard. For if the government chooses to pay disability bene-
fits, a "willing and able" employee 43 will not work. As a result, the gov-
ernment will have to pay disability benefits for an environmental
limitation which it has the power and ability to remove.
III. THE VICKERS DECISION
A. Opinion of the Court
Lanny Vickers, an employee of the Veterans Administration (VA),
filed suit against that agency 44 seeking money damages or equitable relief
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197345 for its refusal to
eliminate tobacco smoke in his workplace. Section 504 prohibits discrim-
ination by federal employers and grantees against otherwise qualified
that Parodi contended that she was unable to work if she was exposed to any tobacco smoke, id. at
737-38 n. 10. Although Parodi had testified that she would work only if her environment was "com-
pletely free" of cigarette smoke, Petitioner's Reply Brief, Petition for Review at 22, Parodi, she
would not be entitled to disability benefits if the government offered her employment in an environ-
ment with some exposure to tobacco smoke but in which she could perform useful and efficient
service.
Because the government had not offered Parodi such employment, the court reasoned that the issue
of whether Parodi required absolute isolation from tobacco smoke or just less exposure than at her
existing workplace was irrelevant to its disposition. 690 F.2d at 738 n. 10.
41. See supra notes 2-4.
42. See supra note 39.
43. 690F.2dat739.
44. Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp 85, 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982). Vickers also sought
recovery against his superior, a smoker. Under the standard announced in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800 (1982), he was entitled to recover only if his superior, a government official, had violated
Iclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Id. at 818. The Vickers court found that Vickers had not proved any such violation. 549 F.
Supp. at 86.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).
Vol. 59:305, 1984
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handicapped persons based on their handicap. 46 Vickers' doctor had pre-
viously diagnosed him as having respiratory diseases which made him
unusually sensitive to tobacco smoke.47 The District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington found that (1) he was handicapped under 29
U.S.C. § 706(7)(B), 48 because his "unusual sensitivity" limited a "ma-
jor life activit[y]', 49 by making him unable to work while exposed to even
a minimal amount of tobacco smoke, but that (2) the Veterans Adminis-
tration had made reasonable efforts to accommodate his handicap. 50
No evidence showed that the VA had discriminated against Vickers
because of his hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke. 51 Vickers urged, how-
ever, that the VA owed him more than the passive duty not to discrimi-
nate against him based on his handicap. He contended that the VA had an
affirmative duty "to make reasonable accommodations to his physical
handicap by providing a work environment that is free of tobacco
smoke.' '52 Expressly reserving its ruling on the question, the court based
its decision on the assumption that the VA was under such a duty.53
The court therefore reviewed in detail the VA's efforts to accommodate
Vickers' hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke. 54 The court noted that, as a
46. Section 504 provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section
706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).
While it is not clear that § 504 imposes a duty on federal employers to make affirmative accommo-
dations to handicapped employees, as opposed to merely refraining from discriminating against
them, see infra note 62, federal employers are required to make accommodations under § 501 of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976). See infra note 60. The private cause of action against such employers
for violations of § 501 provided in § 505(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981), is
subject, however, to a requirement that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(c) (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) is incorporated by reference in § 505(a)(1) to govern
remedies for violations of § 501). See infra note 59.
47. His doctor stated that "[i]t is highly likely that having to work in an enclosed space with an
atmosphere containing cigarette smoke is directly causing and prolonging his condition." Plaintiff's
Trial Brief at 2, Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
48. Under the statute, "the term 'handicapped individual' means... any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
49. 549 F. Supp. at 86-87.
50. Id. at 89.
51. Id. at 87. The court noted that Vickers had received high job performance ratings and at least
three incentive awards. Id.
52. Id.
53. See infra note 59.
54. 549 F. Supp. at 87-89. While the VA had not banned smoking in the workplace, it had
obtained voluntary agreements among Vickers' immediate coworkers not to smoke in the office. It
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result of the VA's accommodations, Vickers was exposed only to smoke
which might "at times drift into" his workplace from adjoining offices. 55
Furthermore, the court emphasized the VA's national policy to maintain
"an equitable balance between the rights of smokers and nonsmokers," 56
and found that Vickers himself had failed to take action to limit his expo-
sure to smoke in the workplace. 57 The court therefore held that the VA
had satisfied its hypothetical obligation to Vickers.
B. Analysis of Court's Opinion
The Vickers court was correct in its determination that hypersensitivity
to tobacco smoke can qualify an individual as "handicapped" under the
Rehabilitation Act. 58 The statutory definition focuses only on the impair-
ment of a person's ability to live his or her life; disease or injury is not
required. The court found that Vickers' sensitivity to tobacco smoke lim-
ited his ability to function in a workplace with tobacco smoke and cor-
rectly regarded working as a major life activity. Nothing more is required
to qualify Vickers as handicapped under the Act.
Had it chosen to rule on the affirmative duty question, the Vickers court
should have held that the VA had a duty to make reasonable accommoda-
tions for Vickers' handicap. 59 As a federal employee, Vickers is entitled
had installed or offered to install physical barriers and equipment to reduce his exposure to tobacco
smoke. The VA also offered Vickers an outside maintenance position. Id. at 88.
The accommodations cited by the court rely in large part on segregating smokers and nonsmokers
to reduce the latter's exposure to tobacco smoke. The effectiveness of such segregation is open to
question. See generally Olshansky, Is Smoker/Nonsmoker Segregation Effective in Reducing Passive
Inhalation among Nonsmokers?, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 737 (1982) (smokers and nonsmokers segre-
gated in a single environmental setting were exposed to similar levels of ambient carbon monoxide).
55. 549 F. Supp. at 89.
56. Id. The Director of the VA Medical Center in which Vickers worked had promulgated a local
policy permitting smoking in office areas. The Vickers court stated that in the absence of a legislative
or agency ban on smoking in the workplace, "the desires of those employees who wish to smoke
cannot be disregarded." Id.
57. The court noted that he failed to move his desk away from a connecting door and that he
could close that door at any time. Either action would have limited his exposure to tobacco smoke.
Id. at 89-90.
58. But see GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477, 479 (1979)
(construing definition of handicapped person under state statute in reliance on 29 U.S.C. § 706: "It is
manifestly clear that the legislature did not intend to include within the meaning of 'handicapped
persons' those people with 'any pulmonary problem' however minor, or all people who are harmed
or irritated by tobacco smoke. ").
59. The court may have left the question unresolved because, although the VA clearly had a duty
to accommodate Vickers under § 501, Vickers had brought his action under § 504. See infra note 60
(overlapping obligations of federal employers under § 501 and § 504). Private actions under § 501,
however, require plaintiffs to exhaust their adminstrative remedies. See supra note 46. Vickers had
not sought administrative relief. Defendant's Reply Memorandum at 5, Vickers. The Vickers court
could properly have denied or postponed relief to him on that basis, even though there is no exhaus-
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to such accommodation under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.60 Federal agencies have a duty under section 501 to ensure that
handicapped individuals are afforded equal opportunities in job assign-
ments and promotions. The remedy provision for an employee or appli-
cant for employment under section 501 explicitly acknowledges that
workplace accommodation is available as a remedy. 61
The Vickers court, however, did not mention section 501. Its decision
assumed that the VA owed a duty of accommodation to handicapped em-
ployees under section 504.62 Because the scope of the federal employer's
tion of remedies requirement for a suit filed for violation of § 504. See Prewitt v. United States Postal
Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (construing overlapping obligations of federal employers
created by 1978 amendments to § 501 and § 504 to require federal employees to exhaust administra-
tive remedies before filing a private cause of action).
60. Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976), has been uniformly
interpreted to require federal employers to make reasonable accommodation to their handicapped
employees. E.g., Ryan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 565 F.2d 762, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see
also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979) (describing § 501 as
requiring "affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps"). Section 501 pro-
vides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality ... in the executive branch shall... submit to
the Civil Service Commission and to the Committee an affirmative action program plan for the
hiring, placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals in such department, agency, or
instrumentality. Such plan shall include a description of the extent to which and methods
whereby the special needs of handicapped employees are being met.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 501(b), 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1976).
Originally, courts did not recognize a private cause of action against a federal employer for viola-
tions of § 501. Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 302 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1981). In
contrast, a private cause of action was judicially implied for violations of § 504. See, e.g., Lloyd v.
Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1287 (7th Cir. 1977). In its original version, however, § 504
did not apply to federal employers. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat.
355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp V. 1981)).
The 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act extended § 504 to apply to "any program or
activity conducted by an executive agency or by the United States Postal Service" and also created a
private cause of action for violations of § 501 in a new section, § 505(a)(1). Rehabilitation, Compre-
hensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, §§
119, 120, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981)). Thus, the
1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act created an overlap in statutory coverage for federal em-
ployers and employees. See generally Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 301-04 (analyzing history and interrela-
tionship of §§ 501 and 504).
61. Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act provides in part:
In fashioning an equitable or affirmative action remedy under [§ 501], a court may take into
account the reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place accommodation, and the
availability of alternatives therefor or other appropriate relief in order to achieve an equitable
and appropriate remedy.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 505, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(l) (Supp. V 1981).
62. The proposition that § 504 imposes an affirmative duty on federal employers to make reason-
able accommodations to handicapped employees is open to question. The United States Supreme
Court has held that a nursing school was not required under § 504 to make major adjustments in its
program for a deaf applicant. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). See
infra note 70. The Court stated that "neither the language, purpose, nor history of § 504 reveals an
intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation on all recipients of federal funds." Davis, 442 U.S.
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duty to accommodate is the same under sections 501 and 504,63 the spe-
cial question raised by this case is whether it includes the obligation to
force smoking employees to forgo that habit while in the workplace.
The Vickers court did not adequately address or resolve this issue.
First, it found from the employer's internal policies a duty to accommo-
date the interests of those employees who smoke as well as the needs of
the handicapped nonsmoker. A federal agency obviously cannot use in-
ternal policy to contradict its statutory duty to accommodate handicapped
employees. Because there is no constitutional or statutory right to smoke
at 411. However, the Court recognized the thin line between refusal to provide affirmative action and
illegal discrimination, and suggested in dictum that "situations may arise where a refusal to modify
an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory." Id. at 412-13. The Court spe-
cifically suggested that it would be an act of illegal discrimination to refuse to implement technologi-
cal advances which enhance the capacity of handicapped individuals to work effectively if such im-
plementation could be accomplished "without imposing undue financial and administrative
burdens." Id. at 412.
Subsequent courts and commentators have relied on this dictum in holding that § 504 requires
accommodation for the handicapped when it does not impose undue burdens on the program or
agency. See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983); cf. Prewitt v.
United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir. 1981). See generally Note, Accommodating
the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55
N.Y.U. L. Rhv 881, 884-85 (1980) (Davis applies only to insurmountable impairment barriers: §
504 requires accommodation to surmountable impairment barriers).
Under this line of analysis, the VA is obligated under § 504 to make reasonable accommodations to
Vickers' handicap because tobacco smoke in the workplace is not an insurmountable barrier. This
analysis is arguably suspect, both because it conflicts with some of the express language in Davis
("neither the language, purpose, nor history of § 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-
action obligation on all recipients of federal funds," 442 U.S. at 411) and because it imposes on all
federal grantees under § 504's "no discrimination" language the same affirmative duty to accommo-
date the handicapped which is far less ambiguously imposed on federal employers by § 501 and on
federal contractors under § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
63. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 & n.21 (5th Cir. 1981). How-
ever, because § 504 applies to all recipients of federal funds, construing § 504 to impose an affirma-
tive duty to accommodate the handicapped affects a broader group of employers and program admin-
istrators than does § 501.
The courts of appeals in four circuits, however, have held that § 504 does not apply to employment
discrimination against handicapped individuals by recipients of federal funds unless providing em-
ployment is a primary objective of the federal assistance. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677
F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1981);
Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892
(1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978). That analysis has
been rejected by the Third Circuit, which recently held that § 504 prohibits any employment discrimi-
nation against the handicapped by recipients of federal funds. Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp..
687 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983). The Supreme Court will presum-
ably resolve this conflict among the circuits.
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in the workplace, 64 there is no source for the "certain rights" 65 which the
Vickers court assigned to smoking employees. The Vickers court inter-
preted those rights to include the right to make a workplace inaccessible
to a handicapped employee. Yet the Vickers court recognized that the leg-
islature can ban smoking in public places and government offices. There
is, however, no reasonable distinction between a legislative ban on smok-
ing in the workplace, which the court expressly said it would enforce, 66
and legislation expressly requiring federal agencies to make reasonable
accommodations to handicapped employees, if to accommodate the han-
dicap requires a ban on smoking in the workplace.
Second, the court never addressed the issue of whether the VA's re-
fusal to ban smoking in its offices was reasonable. The court had found
that exposure to even a minimal amount of tobacco smoke substantially
limited Vickers' capacity to work. 67 His federal employer had refused to
accommodate his handicap by eliminating tobacco smoke in his work-
place. The issue under the Rehabilitation Act is not, therefore, whether
the employer had acted reasonably in its efforts to reduce Vickers' expo-
sure to tobacco smoke: the accommodation he sought was the elimination
of tobacco smoke from his workplace. The question before the court was
whether the VA's refusal to implement a complete ban was reasonable
under the Rehabilitation Act. If not, the VA's refusal violated the Act.
As one court explicity acknowledged, there is a "dearth of decisional
law ' 68 on the scope of the duty owed by federal employers to make rea-
sonable accommodations to their handicapped employees. In evaluating
the reasonableness of a refusal to accommodate, however, courts have
relied on two factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in its
first decision construing section 504, Southeastern Community College v.
Davis:69 (1) whether the proposed accommodation would change the es-
64. There are two old state cases supporting an individual's right to smoke, at least in his or her
own home or in open spaces. See City of Zion v. Behrens, 262 Il. 510, 104 N.E. 836 (1914);
Hershberg v. City of Barbourville, 142 Ky. 60, 133 S.W. 985 (1911). These cases were decided long
before scientific evidence was available regarding the hazards of involuntary smoking and they rest
on the overbreadth of the state laws construed therein. Behrens, 104 N.E. at 837; Hershberg, 133
S.W. at 986. Their persuasive value in this setting is nil.
It is not clear, however, whether federal employees so addicted to tobacco smoking that they are
unable to work without smoking could succeed in a "reverse-Vickers" suit for violation of § 501 if
denied the opportunity to smoke at work. Although the definition of the term "handicapped individ-
ual" in § 706(7)(B) expressly excludes a drug abuser whose current use of drugs constitutes a direct
harm to the safety of others under §§ 503 and 504, there is no corresponding exclusion for § 501. 29
U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
65. 549 F. Supp. at 89.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 87.
68. Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981).
69. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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sential nature of the program and (2) whether the accommodation would
require extensive costs or other undue burdens on the employer or pro-
gram administrator. 70
Tobacco smoking is clearly not an essential part of the work performed
by the VA, particularly in its role as a provider of health care. 71 The
identifiable costs from instituting a no-smoking policy may include in-
creased tobacco breaks for smoking employees72 and resignation of
smoking employees unable to tolerate a no-smoking policy. 73 However,
these costs are reasonable because no-smoking policies improve the
health of all employees 74 and actually reduce an employer's overall em-
ployment costs. 75
No precedent construes section 504 or section 501 to require a ban on
tobacco smoking in the workplace as an accommodation to a hypersensi-
tive employee. Lack of precedent does not, however, indicate that such a
requirement would be an "unreasonable" accommodation. The proposed
accommodation in Vickers would have prohibited smoking in the work-
place, eliminating a danger to the health of smokers and nonsmokers
alike. 76 The very internal policy relied on by the court in denying Vickers
the relief he sought states: "In light of the substantial evidence of the
effects of smoking, it will be the policy of the Veterans Administration to
undertake agencywide wide [sic] initiatives to reduce smoking in its facil-
ities." 77 Because neither the nature nor the cost of the proposed accom-
modation would impose an undue burden on the VA, Vickers was entitled
to have the court require the VA to ban tobacco smoke in his workplace.
70. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Prewitt, 662
F.2d at 308-09 (relying on similar factors identified by EEOC regulation implementing § 504).
Davis had applied for admission to the Associate Degree Nursing program at Southeastern Com-
munity College. Due to a hearing disability, Davis was unable to communicate effectively without
relying on lipreading skills. She was denied admission in part because of the College's belief that she
would be unable to participate successfully in the clinical portion of the nursing program. 442 U.S. at
400-02. The Davis Court emphasized that she would require either close individual supervision by
faculty members in clinical courses, id. at 407, 409, or dispensation from those courses, which would
have "fundamental[ly] alter[ed] ... the nature of the program," id. at 409-10.
71. The VA's national policy relied on by the Vickers court identifies as its objective the reduc-
tion of tobacco smoking in its facilities. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Exh. A, Vickers.
72. See supra note 39.
73. Cf. Affidavit of Robert Patterson at 2, Vickers (affidavit of one of Vickers' coworkers: "I do
expect to have a designated place [at work] where I can smoke").
74. See supra notes 2-4. Moreover, to the extent that smokers are forced to cut back their smok-
ing habits, their risk of death from lung cancer declines. 1982 HEALTH CONSEQUENCES, supra note 2,
at 5.
75. See supra note 39.
76. See supra notes 2-4.
77. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exh. A,
Vickers.
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IV. PARODI AND VICKERS COMPARED: WHO QUALIFIES FOR
RELIEF UNDER THE STATUTES?
Under the disability retirement statute, 78 plaintiffs must show that they
suffer from a disease or injury which prevents useful and efficient service.
The level of minor throat and eye irritation suffered by most nonsmokers
would probably not constitute a disease within the meaning of the Act.
Under the Rehabilitation Act, 79 claimants must show that their adverse
reactions to tobacco smoke substantially impair a major life activity. Ob-
viously, few employees seeking bans on smoking in the workplace could
qualify for relief under either of these statutes. 80
Even so, the Parodi and Vickers decisions can have a "derivative im-
pact" which benefits all nonsmokers. Under the Rehabilitation Act, ac-
commodations to a hypersensitive employee which reduce or eliminate
tobacco smoke in the workplace benefit all employees who want smoking
prohibited in the workplace. In Vickers' case, some nonsmoking "con-
cerned persons" have presumably benefited from the workplace accom-
modations already implemented because of the presence of a hypersensi-
tive coworker. Thus, the "concerned persons" receive judicial relief in a
derivative sense.
Under the disability retirement statute, the employee who qualifies as
"disabled" can influence the workplace environment only at the em-
ployer's discretion. However, the Parodi decision exerts economic pres-
sure on the employer to alter the workplace in order to avoid paying disa-
bility benefits. If the employer responds to that pressure, nonsmoking
coworkers of Parodi receive a similar derivative benefit.
Statutory relief for the hypersensitive employee is not unique. Prior to
Parodi and Vickers, courts have awarded unemployment benefits to such
individuals based on their justified refusal to work in environments where
smoking was permitted. 8' For the first time, however, these decisions
recognize that federal statutes may require employers to reduce or elimi-
nate tobacco smoke in the workplace.82 Both decisions have implications
for application to other statutory schemes.
For example, most state fair employment practices statutes prohibit
discrimination against prospective or current employees on the basis of
78. 5 U.S.C. § 8337(a) (1982).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
80. See supra note 14.
81. See supra note 17.
82. The Vickers decision assumed that the employer owed a duty to make reasonable workplace
accommodation; the Parodi decision exerted economic pressure by its express analysis of employer
options to modify the workplace instead of paying disability benefits.
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handicap. 83 Although a majority of such statutes do not address the ques-
tion of workplace accommodation, 84 some legislation expressly requires
employers to make reasonable accommodations to their handicapped em-
ployees. 85 Similarly, although most state retirement schemes provide di-
sability benefits only to the totally disabled, a significant number define
disability as the inability to perform in the specific position last held by
the employee. 86 While likelihood of success for a hypersensitive em-
ployee on the basis of such statutes will vary depending on the language
and construction of the legislation involved, Parodi and Vickers are per-
suasive authority that such statutes could be used as the foundation for
other hypersensitive employees seeking to ban tobacco smoke in the
workplace.87
V. PARODI AND VICKERS CONTRASTED: COMPENSATION VS.
ACCOMMODATION AND MANDATORY VS. OPTIONAL
REMEDIES
The Parodi and Vickers decisions address the issue of accommodation
to the hypersensitive nonsmoker by a limitation or ban on tobacco smoke
in the workplace. Their analyses differ markedly, however, because the
83. Forty-seven states prohibit employment discrimination against the handicapped, although
five of these prohibit such discrimination only by the state itself as an employer. 8A LAB. REL REP
(BNA) 451:101-:104 (Nov. 1983).
84. Id. §§ 453,455,457.
85. See, e.g.. WASH ADMIN CODE R. 162-22-080(l) (1980) ("It is an unfair practice for an
employer to fail or refuse to make reasonable accommodations to the sensory, mental, or physical
limitations of employees, unless the employer can demonstrate that such an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. "). Other states, however, have
legislation which expressly provides that the duty not to discriminate does not include an affirmative
duty to make workplace accommodations. See, e.g., KY REV. STAT. § 207-150 (1981) ("No em-
ployer shall . . . discriminate against any handicapped individual with respect to . . . conditions of
employment because of such person's physical handicap .... This subsection shall not be construed
to require any employer to modify his physical facilities or grounds in any way .... ").
86. Compare 2 NATIONAL Assoc OF STATE RETIREMENT ADMIN'RS. SURVEY OF STATE RETIRE-
MENT SYSTEMS. State of Nebraska, County Employees Retirement System pt. II.A (1982) (requisite
standard is total disability: "An employee may retire as a result of disability at any age if unable to
engage in a gainful activity by reasons of physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or to be of long-continued duration.") with I id., State of Connecticut, State Employ-
ees' Retirement System pt. II.E (provides disability benefits for the first 24 months if state employee
is disabled to perform job previously occupied; thereafter, standard of eligibility is total disability)
and id., State of Delaware, State Employees' Retirement System pt. IL.A (state employee with five
years credited service is entitled to disability benefits if she has a "physical or mental disability which
prevents [her] from performing duties of position"). See generally NATIONAL ASSOC OF STATE RE-
TIREMENT ADMIN'RS. SURVEY OF STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS (1982) (compilation of individual sur-
veys from almost all of the 50 states).
87. See Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231 (1980) (hypersensitive
claimant awarded partial disability benefits under state workers' compensation statute).
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statutes at issue in each case serve very different purposes. The disability
retirement statute, the basis for the Parodi decision, serves only to com-
pensate the disabled person for the loss of earning power she suffers as a
result of her inability to provide useful and efficient service. Under the
Rehabilitation Act, the basis for the Vickers decision, the employer is
required to make reasonable modifications in the workplace or job re-
quirements to accommodate the special needs of the handicapped em-
ployee.
This difference in statutory design is reflected in the courts' analyses.
The key questions under the Rehabilitation Act are what constitutes rea-
sonable accommodation and when a refusal to implement accommodation
is reasonable. The Vickers court therefore examined in detail the steps
taken and proposed by the VA to reduce Vickers' exposure to tobacco
smoke. Under the disability retirement statute, workplace accommoda-
tion is at issue only because the hypersensitive employee is not disabled
within the meaning of the statute if the employer removes the disabling
environmental limitation. Consequently, the Parodi court did not exam-
ine in any detail potential changes the government could make in the
workplace for removing the environmental limitation. 88
The statutes also place markedly different duties on the government
employer. Under the Rehabilitation Act, federal employers are directed to
make reasonable accommodations to handicapped employees. Prospec-
tive and existing employees injured by an employer's failure or refusal to
make such accommodation can get judicial relief to force compliance.
Because the disability retirement statute requires the government only to
compensate its disabled employees, the government need not accommo-
date them, regardless of the feasibility of the proposed accommoda-
tions.89
For the hypersensitive federal employee who wishes to force the em-
ployer to reduce or eliminate tobacco smoke in the workplace, a suit
under the Rehabilitation Act is clearly preferable to a suit under the disa-
bility retirement statute. An individual who qualifies as "disabled" under
the latter statute is also likely to be considered as handicapped under the
former, and the persons eligible for disability benefits are also the em-
ployees entitled to the benefits of the statutory requirements of section
501. Hypersensitive employees should pursue relief under the disability
88. Indeed, the Parodi court used the terms "reduction" and "elimination" almost interchange-
ably in its suggestions to remove the environmental limitation. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
89. The employer is of course under economic pressure to make accommodations to avoid pay-
ing disability benefits, see supra p. 319, but the employee has no judicially enforceable right to force
it to do so, see supra p. 311.
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retirement statute only if they prefer disability benefits to continued em-
ployment in an improved workplace.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under Parodi, a hypersensitive nonsmoker can force her employer to
make a choice: pay her disability benefits or limit or ban tobacco smoke in
the workplace. After Vickers, a federal employer may have to accommo-
date the needs of a hypersensitive individual by limiting or banning to-
bacco smoke in the workplace. These decisions offer only derivative re-
lief to the nonsmoker who is merely concerned about the health hazards
of involuntary smoking. Given the judiciary's general reluctance to grant
relief based on a possibility rather than a probability of future harm, 90
concerned nonsmokers should seek relief in legislative action. 91
Carolyn Cliff
90. See Ruckstuhl v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 57 Pa.
Commw. 302,426 A.2d 719, 721 (1981):
Although it is now generally accepted that cigarette smoke may be harmful to smokers and
non-smokers alike, we cannot presume for unemployment compensation purposes that anyone
exposed to cigarette smoke in one's work environment is so physically harmed that a voluntary
termination of employment will be automatically justified and unemployment benefits granted.
But see Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408, 415 (Ch. Div.
1976) (quoting Dr. Daum, an industrial medicine specialist):
"'Longterm health hazards causing or contributing to chronic disease are rarely recognized as
work related and impede the collection of data necessary to promulgate a safe limit of low level
exposure. In the absence of such data or longterm scientific studies dealing with a known noxi-
ous agent, it is a sound and accepted procedure in the practice of preventive medicine to elimi-
nate the hazardous substance whenever possible until firm scientific guidelines can be estab-
lished."
91. See generally STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y. supra note 1, at 21-106 (examining federal,
state, and local regulation of smoking).
The efficacy of legislation for hypersensitive employees will depend on the requirements it im-
poses on employers. Compare Wash. H.R. 229, 48th Leg. (1983) (limiting smoking in the office
workplace: "Employers shall provide smoke-free areas for nonsmokers within existing facilities to
the extent possible, but employers are not required to incur any expense to make structural or other
physical modifications to provide these areas.") with Wash. H.R. 1464, 48th Leg. (1984) (prohibit-
ing smoking in the office workplace "[i]f an accommodation that is satisfactory to all affected
nonsmoking employees cannot be reached").
